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The study examines the effects of board process 
and managerial ownership on company 
performance of Malaysian public listed companies.  
Unlike traditional governance models that 
emphasize on board structure, this study focuses on 
board process. Two types of data are used; a survey 
to Malaysian directors and company annual 
reports. In total, 175 companies responded to the 
questionnaires, which represent 26% of response 
rate.  The results of the study provide evidence that 
board’s risks oversight and performance of 
independent directors are associated to company 
performance.  The results provide feedback to the 
policy makers in Malaysia as the results indicate 
that board effectiveness influences company 
performance. 
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 I I#TRODUCTIO# 
Directors are persons appointed or elected 
according to the law. The whole of directors 
collectively, form the board of directors.   The 
board of directors is expected to monitor the 
management decisions and protect the 
shareholders’ interests as well as the company as a 
whole. However, shareholders are under 
disadvantage if the decision turns out to be 
inefficient and very risky due to poor monitoring 
by the directors (King & Wen, 2011). The study 
aims to determine the effect of board process and 
managerial ownership on company performance.  
This paper is organized as follows.  In section II, 
the interrelationships between company 
performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms; board process and managerial 
ownership are provided.  Section III discusses the 
research methodology and data collection.  The 
results are presented in section IV.  The discussion 
and conclusion remarks are set out in the final 
section. 
 
II LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Board process is the way directors discharging 
their duties in steering the board (Macus, 2008) 
and reflection of decision making activities. This 
study incorporates four pertinent variables as the 
proxy of board process namely board’s risks 
oversight, accessibility of information, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO)’s performance evaluation 
and performance of independent directors.  
 
Board’s risks oversight: A business risk relates to 
the inability of a company to predict the future 
performance in uncertain environment (Sobel & 
Reding, 2004). The board roles in risk management 
are very important so as to ensure that the company 
will survive in uncertain economic condition.  
Therefore, board should regularly question the 
management on risks that they perceive the 
company will be facing (Raber, 2003).  Sobel and 
Reading (2004) argue that board must actively 
involve in risk management process by providing 
expertise and judgment to the strategic process.  In 
addition, the senior management should be given 
the autonomy to manage the risks within the 
accepted risk tolerance by the board.  Apparently, 
the director’s ability in analytical thinking skills 
and strategic perceptions are important in risk 
management and these criteria have influence on 
company performance (Kula & Tatoglu, 2006). 
Therefore, this study assumes that board that 
evaluates current and future risks of the company 
provides a positive impact on company 
performance. 
 
Accessibility of information: Directors must have 
sufficient access to information in order for the 
board to function effectively. Hence, directors must 
ensure that they are given relevant materials which 
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will be discussed in the meeting by the 
management or company secretary. Having more 
access to information allows directors to improve 
their problem solving ability during board 
deliberation (Macus, 2008), provide constructive 
arguments (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and enhance 
their accountability to the shareholders (Kula, 
2005).  Therefore, the directors’ ability to get 
access to company information is expected to have 
effect on company performance. 
 
CEO’s performance evaluation: Performance 
evaluation is a process of managing performance in 
which it incorporates regular evaluation, feedback 
and counseling (Gomez, 2010).  Agency theory 
supports that management as well as the CEO’s 
actions and decisions should be monitored and 
evaluated by the board (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The process is crucial as it influences the decisions 
that relate to promotions, transfers or terminations 
of the CEOs.  Further, the evaluation provides 
feedback to CEO on how company views their 
performance (Robbins & Judge, 2009; Dulewicz & 
Herbert, 2004).     
 
The MCCG also recommended that every board 
member including the CEO need to be assessed.  
Therefore, the CEOs are more likely to put extra 
attention on decision making process as their 
performance will be accessed through the outcome 
of their decisions.  Hence, this study expects a 
positive relationship between CEO’s performance 
evaluation and company performance. 
Performance of independent directors: The 
agency perspectives support the view that the 
greater the proportion of outside directors is 
essential for effective monitoring of management 
performance and self-interest actions. Besides, the 
management decisions must be monitored 
vigorously by the board to avoid any expropriation 
of minority interests (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). 
Effective independent directors with the ability to 
understand the company business, provide 
unbiased judgment and bring in practical ideas 
based on their professional experience during 
board deliberation are able to improve company 
performance (Yeap, 2009; Hasnah & Hasnah, 
2009).  In addition, independent directors with the 
capability in communicating with those people 
who involve directly in the decision making are 
more likely to get update on any major events that 
have detrimental effects to the company such as 
example bankruptcy, merger or any changes in 
regulations (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). These 
positive attitudes of effective independent directors 
are able to contribute to positive company value. 
 
Managerial ownership:  In Malaysia, insider 
shareholdings are very common (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006).  The owners are normally 
appointed as the managers (Mazlina & Ayoib, 
2011).  High levels of managerial ownership allow 
the owners-managers to participate actively in the 
decision making process.  Besides, they have high 
motivation to bring more profits into the company 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Such mechanism 
enables the interest of shareholders to be protected 
(Harris & Raviv, 2008).  Therefore, the study 
assumes that company with high managerial 
ownership is expected to have a positive effect on 
company performance. 
 
Control variables: Larger companies are able to 
establish various diversifications in business and 
remain stable cash flow.  The accesses to capital 
markets are also easier for large companies. 
However, companies that have established in the 
market for a long period tend to become more 
conservative in the strategies, therefore, affect 
company performance.  Meanwhile, companies 
with high level of leverage are unable to invest in 
profitable projects, thus, such situation affects 
company performance.  Therefore, three variables; 
company size, age and leverage are included in the 
analysis.  The variables are expected to have 
influence on company performance. 
 
III  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample size and data collection 
 
The study was conducted on companies listed on 
main market of Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 
2009.  The study combines a survey approach and 
secondary data.  For survey approach, the 
questionnaires were disseminated to the company 
chairman, independent director, executive director 
and non-independent non-executive director in 
order to get a balance directors’ perception on 
board process.  Once the researcher received the 
completed questionnaire, it will be matched with 
the secondary data for that particular company. The 
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information of managerial ownership, company 
characteristics and performance were extracted 
from the annual report of 2007 to 2009.  From 687 
companies (after excluding companies which were 
listed under financial sector, new companies listed 
in 2007, 2008 and 2009 as well as PN17 and 
Ammended PN17 companies) a total of 175 
companies (27 per cent) participated in this study.   
 
Construction of questionnaire and measurement 
of variables 
 
The questionnaire was developed based upon the 
literatures and inputs from two risk specialists and 
an executive chairman of a committee from 
regulatory bodies and three public listed directors. 
Besides, the items in the questionnaires were 
adapted from MCCG, Carey, Patsalox-Fox and 
Useem (2009), Wyman (2009), Ingley and Van der 
Walt (2005), Epstein and Roy (2005), Sang-Woo 
and Il (2004), Sobel and Reding (2004), Dulewicz 
and Herbert (2004), Raber (2003), Finkelstein and 
Mooney (2003) and Taylor, Tracy, Renard, 
Harrison and Carroll (1995).  Four proxies of board 
process namely board’s risks oversight, 
accessibility of information, Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO)’s performance evaluation and 
performance of independent directors are used in 
the study. 
 
There are six items on demographic information 
and 31 items on board process.   The questions on 
board risks oversight, accessibility of information 
and CEO’s performance evaluation are designed to 
measure the degree of directors’ agreement using 
5-point scales ranging from “1” as strongly 
disagree to “5” as strongly agree.  In relation to the 
performance of independent directors, the 
statements were measured using a Likert-scale 
ranging from very “1” as very poor to “5” as 
outstanding.  Higher scores indicate higher level of 
independent directors’ performance. Company 
performance is proxied by return on equity (ROE).  
The ratio is determined by dividing net profit to the 
average common shareholders’ equity. Managerial 
ownership refers to the proportion of shares own 
by all executive directors to total outstanding 
shares (Mazlina & Ayoib, 2011).  For the purpose 
of analysis, companies with at least 5 per cent of 
executive directors’ shareholdings were coded as 1, 
otherwise 0.  In addition, the total asset is used as 
proxy for company size.  Company age is 
measured by referring to the year of listed and it is 
subtracted with the date of financial year end in 
2007, 2008 and 2009.  Meanwhile, company 
leverage is measured by dividing total debts to total 
assets. 
 
IV  RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the results of factor analysis.  
Internal reliability test indicates strong Cronbach 
Alpha values from every factor ranging from 0.722 
to 0.935. Meanwhile, table 2 provides descriptive 
statistics of board process attributes managerial 
ownership, company characteristics and 
performance.
Table 1. Factor analysis 
  Eigen value Cumulative Alpha 
Factor 1: Performance of independent directors  12.720 19.067 0.935 
Ability to provide strategic vision  0.775    
How effective the independent directors represent the 
interest of shareholders? 
0.757    
Relationship with senior management  0.696    
How effective the independent directors represent the 
interest of stakeholders? 
0.688    
Understanding on company business  0.677    
Contribution in board committees  0.650    
Record of constructively challenging and debating issues 
during board meetings  
0.650    
Relationship with the CEO  0.601    
Ability to apply his or her industries experience  0.601    
Interactive communication of independent directors with 
other board members  
0.536    
Factor 2: CEO’s performance evaluation     
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Board communicates to the CEO on his/her success based 
on the evaluation result 
0.835 3.09 36.385 0.925 
Board evaluates CEO by using KPI 0.786    
Board establishes an exit mechanism which is tied up with 
CEO's performance 
0.737    
Board implements a reward system which is based on long 
term performance 
0.724    
Board communicates to the CEO on his/her failures based 
on the evaluation result 
0.721    
Board provides avenue for CEO to explain on the state of 
CEO’s performance 
0.712    
Board communicates their expectations clearly to the CEO 0.708    
Board accepts feedback from CEO during the process of 
setting KPI 
0.677    
Factor 3: Board’s risk oversight  1.99 52.309 0.911 
Board requires senior management to deliberate on 
emerging risks that the management perceived the company 
will be facing 
0.789    
Board gets update from senior management on risk 
management matters 
0.731    
Board raise concern on risk management 0.712    
Board communicate on risk tolerance to senior management 0.699    
Board attends relevant risk management training 0.678    
Board reviews its strategy during crisis 0.648    
Members of board ask the senior management to use 
scenario analysis in identifying potential vulnerabilities 
0.614    
Board has necessary financial knowledge to analyze the 
financial statement 
0.584    
Factor 4: Accessibility of information  1.89 63.501 0.722 
Directors discuss issues thoroughly 0.830    
Directors have access to information via managers 0.816    
At time where directors need to refer to company business 
records and books, their access is denied 
0.726    
When outside professional services is needed, the expenses 
will be borne by the company 
0.726    
Directors received sufficient materials/ information before 
board meetings 
0.759    
Note: K-M-O measure of sampling = 0.911  Barlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant; p<0.000
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for company characteristics and board attributes 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Return on equity 2.61 28.47 -213.89 62.58 
Board’s risks oversight 3.97 0.42 2.80 5.00 
Accessibility of information 3.68 0.48 2.32 5.00 
CEO’s performance evaluation 3.83 0.46 2.48 5.00 
Performance of independent directors 3.81 0.43 2.58 4.80 
Company size (RM) 1,880M 6,787M 25M 69,643M 
Age of company (years) 15.28 11.64 2.00 48.00 
Leverage (ratio) 41.61 20.63 4.63 89.64 
Managerial ownership:     
At least 5% 
   Frequency (%) 
 
77 (44%) 
   
Less than 5%: 
   Frequency (%) 
 
98 (56%) 
   
 Before running the regression analysis, the 
company size and leverage are transformed into 
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logarithm to prevent the heteroscedasticity 
problem.  Besides, test for multicolinearity was 
carried out.  Independent variables with variance 
inflation factor (VIF) values more than 10 show a 
serious multicolinearity (Chatterjee, Hadi & Price, 
2000).  The result shows that there is no evidence 
of multicolinearity since the VIF value is between 
the range of 1.157 and 1.469. 
 
Table 3. Regression results 
 Coef.                    t-value 
Board’s risks oversight 0.175 2.103** 




Performance of independent 
director 
0.139 1.716* 
Managerial ownership 0.078 0.309 
Company size 0.200 2.561** 
Company age -0.100 -1.323 
Leverage -0.144 -1.704* 
R–square 0.187  
Adjusted R-square 0.148  
F statistic 4.788***  
***, **, *indicates regression analysis is statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 
The results of regression analysis are shown in 
Table 3.  With regards to board process, board’s 
risks oversight and performance of independent 
directors have significant influence on company 
performance. The results show no significant 
association between company performance and the 
independent variables of accessibility of 
information and CEO’s performance evaluation.  
However, the expected direction of the relationship 
remains the same. Out of three control variables, 
only two variables namely company size and 
leverage indicate significant relationships with 
company performance. Company age indicates 
insignificant result. 
 
V    DISCUSSIO#S A#D CO#CLUSIO# 
 
The study aims to examine the influences of board 
process and managerial ownership on company 
performance.  The result indicates that board’s 
risks oversight is associated with company 
performance.  In that regard, board that raises 
concern  on risks management, gets the senior 
management to use scenario analysis in identifying 
potential vulnerabilities, encourage the 
management to deliberate on emerging risks that 
the management anticipates the company will be 
facing and review strategy during crisis contribute 
to company performance.   
 
 
In addition, company performance is also related to 
performance of independent directors. Independent 
directors, who are able to provide strategic vision, 
prepare for board meetings and constructive 
challenge to the ideas of management team brings 
positive effect to company performance. The 
finding is consistent with Hasnah and Hasnah 
(2009) who assert that directors that are able to 
independently influence the decision making 
process are found in high performing companies. 
Besides, independent directors with sufficient 
knowledge on accounting and finance are able to 
have better understanding on company financial 
statement (Wan Fauziah, & Amrstrong, 2012).   
 
The CEO’s performance evaluation however, could 
not influence company performance.  The possible 
reason is due to different procedures of CEO’s 
evaluation between one company and another.  The 
approach and procedures to evaluate the CEO is 
not standardized as 191 directors who responded to 
The questionnaire informed that the evaluation 
process is conducted formally. Meanwhile, 72 
directors answered the process is conducted 
informal. Besides, the company ownership also 
influences the evaluation process.  Directors that 
have family ties with the controlling shareholders 
reduce the procedure in CEO’s evaluation 
(Westphal, 1999).  The result also indicates that the 
accessibility of information is not related to 
company performance.  The possible reason is that 
the effectiveness of board in interpreting the 
meaning of the information is important rather than 
just accepting the information.   
 
Besides, the result does not support that there is 
significant relationship between managerial 
ownership and company performance.  One 
explanation for the lack of correlation between 
managerial ownership and company performance 
could be that this study does not differentiate 
between those who hold the shares for a long and 
short period of time.  This may suggest that 
companies with owner-managers who hold the 
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shares for a long period are more established and 
well-known.  
 
Besides, company size and leverage are other 
influential factors that influence company 
performance.  Larger companies tend to have easy 
access of various resources which in turn, gives 
positive effect to company performance (Kula, 
2005).  Meanwhile, company performance is 
negatively related to company leverage.  The result 
indicates that companies with high dependency on 
debt financing are unable to invest in more risky 
and profitable projects; thus, such situation affects 
company performance (Chang, 2004). 
 
There are few limitations related with the 
methodology of the study.  Directors who 
answered the questionnaires may not give honest 
responses as they might think that there is a risk 
that their answers could be revealed to the 
shareholders, regulatory bodies or competitors.  
However, guarantees are given in the cover letter 
that the directors’ answers will be kept 
confidential.  With regards to future research, 
studies on the influence of board’s risks oversight 
and performance of independent directors on 
company performance are still scanty. Therefore, 
studies could be done to verify the result.  Besides, 
the analysis based on the company sector may also 
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